this post was submitted on 11 Aug 2025
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Y'all looking to get in on this? (r.50501.chat)
submitted 3 days ago by FiftyFiftyOne to c/Mirror
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Originally Posted By u/q0_0p At 2025-08-10 08:00:14 PM | Source

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[–] lmmarsano@lemmynsfw.com 2 points 3 days ago* (last edited 3 days ago)

Approval voting is susceptible to strategies including burial, which leads to a "chicken dilemma".

ExampleConsider a distribution of voter preferences

  • a > b: 2
  • b > a: 2
  • c: 3

When every voter approves their top 2 choices, we have

  • a: 4
  • b: 4
  • c: 3

without a winner. In the next round, when every voter approves their 1st choice, we have

  • a: 2
  • b: 2
  • c: 3

and c (the least wanted candidate) wins.

Among ranked ballot systems, ranked-choice voting isn't that great, either.
Example

  • A > B > C: 2
  • C > B > A: 2
  • B > C > A: 1

Who wins according to instant run-off? C. Who wins against every opponent 1-on-1? B.

It fails the Condorcet criterion (elect the candidate who would beat all others 1-on-1 when it exists).

There are better methods such as ranked pairs: this nice table compares voting methods by a wide range of properties including Condorcet criterion.