This battlefield approach is likely to become a lasting part of Russian military practice, making it relevant for those preparing to counter Russian aggression

All credits to Tatarigami_UA and Frontelligence Insight team

Thread with key findings here: https://xcancel.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1937204380740256083

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[–] supersquirrel@sopuli.xyz 5 points 1 week ago* (last edited 6 days ago) (3 children)

Why don't they have any APCs? What was causing them to lose them at such a high rate? Surely if they produce more of them, they won't lose them again to the exact same battlefield tactics.

Because they have resorted to throwing large numbers of armored vehicles at a foe that has innovated with new technology far better and has large amounts of foreign military help especially along intelligence and target acquisition tactics.

The reality is that in Ukraine, the drone and artillery concentration is such that armored vehicles aren't effective. What is effective is having small agile units that can advance before the enemy can direct fire at them.

This could not be further from the truth, I can link plenty of sources to this but no armored vehicles are just as important as they ever have been and you are falling prey to shallow popular mechanics style future war hype pieces if you think that drones and artillery make armor obsolete.

To point out something basic, the reason Ukraine hasn't been able to make decisive use of the 30 or so abrams and 30 or so leopards main battle tanks they were given (which is actually quite an intimidating number of tanks given that these tanks eat Russian tanks for breakfast, well actually usually for a midnight snack...) is that Ukraine hasn't until recently had the necessary artillery to support an armored assault outside the context of decisive air power (which Ukraine also doesn't have).

The thing people often don't realize about main battle tanks is they are much more vulnerable to infantry than one would assume, even when the infantry opposing the tank don't have the means to directly destroy the tank. Tanks must either

be heavily screened with infantry and other assets to help them not miss a hidden enemy with anti-tank capability or some kind of physical tank trap/hole designed to strand the tank crew in open ground vulnerable to artillery

Or...

this is the most critical thing! Main battle tanks are best used to create a breach through heavily entrenched enemy lines, but a crucial element of this push must be a very closely coordinated, absolutely oppressive rolling artillery barrage that advances along the front and corridors of an armored heavy assault. This rolling barrage of artillery changes the calculus as not being in a trench or an armored vehicle as infantry becomes a stochastic risk from shrapnel flying out of the air and ending your life.

Tanks can move through this kind of intense breach opened at the absolute most high intensity conflict areas in a land war and survive the hellish conditions which might include very close by artillery support to repel counterattacks.

[–] jasory@programming.dev -4 points 6 days ago (2 children)

So your response is to make an irrelevant and sophomoric monologue?

You acknowledge yourself that the ideal tactics don't actually work in Ukraine. And yet you never ask yourself why, and how you are supposed to mitigate the countermeasures.

Also, try not to accuse others of falling to a notion, when they give zero evidence for you to claim clairvoyance. Notice that I didn't accuse you of falling for the "meat wave" notion, even though you were almost certainly alluding to it.

[–] supersquirrel@sopuli.xyz 4 points 6 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (1 children)

You really think that because you understand math and programming that magically makes you understand war don't you?

sigh the thing is this is basic stuff with armored/mechanized warfare, it isn't new, so you obviously really really REALLY don't know what you are talking about and as smart as you are you undermine and weaponize all that intelligence by being so confidently wrong and unable to listen.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XJE76Lt4g7E

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KySzPADd_Xg

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_fy24eKQIYE

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=EVEDUmDDqHo

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=i3MbjT7ofdI

https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/ukrainian_armor_llc_is_ready_to_mass_produce_varta_2_apc_integrated_with_sich_30mm_gun_turret-14598.html

The long-awaited combat vehicle entering serial production opens new opportunities to acquire vital armor for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and find export success globally Ukrainian Armor LLC has officially announced the completion of testing and codification procedures for its new Varta-2 wheeled armored vehicle, which has now received clearance for delivery to the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

This milestone marks the beginning of serial production of a combat platform that frontline soldiers have repeatedly requested, according to the company’s press service.

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/ukraine-s-international-legion-hails-bradley-s-resilience-in-saving-lives-50484889.html

M113s have become indispensable for Ukraine’s armed forces. These vehicles not only help stop Russian advances with their advanced weaponry but also save the lives of countless Ukrainian soldiers. For Paradox and his comrades, the Bradley is more than just a vehicle—it’s a trusted member of their team, one that consistently proves its worth in the face of relentless danger.

“Our determination to rescue it wasn’t just about saving a piece of equipment,” Paradox explained. “The M113 saves lives every day. It’s a symbol of survival and victory.”

https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/breaking-news-france-to-continue-military-aid-to-ukraine-with-phase-out-of-army-combat-vehicles-and-missiles

It was a highly unusual package at that moment. There were 60 boats, 400 vehicles, and 1,600 missiles. The boats and missiles I understood then, but only now am I able to grasp the importance of 400 vehicles. Britain set the ball rolling. Since they released the aid package before the United States did, I think it nudged the United States to include a decent amount of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. Now, Sweden is sending 650 vehicles.

To help with mobility, France has sent 38 AMX-10 RCR armored vehicles, and approximately 260 VABs armored personnel carriers. These vehicles have been crucial in allowing Ukrainian forces to remain mobile and protected on the battlefield. Additionally, Ukraine has received a range of logistical support in the form of Renault TRM 2000 trucks, Renault TRM 10000 fuel trucks, and Peugeot P4 off-road vehicles, which were partially funded by crowdfunding efforts from the Ukrainian public.

https://shankar20.medium.com/why-the-allies-are-pouring-ifvs-and-apcs-into-ukraine-91f68dcfc5c6

Estimates vary, but it is reasonable to assume the Russians have around half a million troops in Ukraine. As Russian Defense Minister Belosov and President Putin warily watch their Soviet-era tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers deplete at an alarming rate, there is only one recourse they have: pile up the infantry.

They are already doing that, and they are going to do it even more.

...

They cannot repeat the same mistake the Russians have made by asking their soldiers to find their way to the frontline. Ukraine needs a significant number of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs). They need these vehicles now and a steady flow of them in the future. Ukraine requires a highly mobile army that can move in and out of the frontline at an alarming speed.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2025

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]

The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]

Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia's reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.