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In May 2025, Tidal.com prompted users to accept their updated terms. The differences are not explained & the entire TIDAL application is blocked until the user accepts the new terms, constituting an example of coerced post-purchase EULA modification. Coupled with the need for users to follow a complex opt-out process for certain terms, this has lead to Tidalbeing accused of adopting a consumer-unfreindly posture with this TOS change

Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measures necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.

For a few years now, several legislators in North America, Europe, and Australia have expressed concern about children and teens accessing certain types of content online. While there is no doubt some online content can be worrisome, implementing a technological solution for this is extremely problematic.

By mandating platforms to be legally responsible to verify a user's age, regulators effectively force them to identify each user requesting access to content deemed inappropriate under a certain age threshold.

If these regulations continue to proliferate, this could lead to the end of pseudonymity online.

Despite their misleading marketing, TeleMessage, the company that makes a modified version of Signal used by senior Trump officials, can access plaintext chat logs from its customers.

In this post I give a high level overview of how the TeleMessage fake Signal app, called TM SGNL, works and why it's so insecure. Then I give a thorough analysis of the source code for TM SGNL's Android app, and what led me to conclude that TeleMessage can access plaintext chat logs. Finally, I back up my analysis with as-of-yet unpublished details about the hack of TeleMessage.