couch1potato

The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) a terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage, (2) the aggregate insured losses from certified acts of terrorism must be $200 million in a year for the government coverage to begin, and (3) an individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are met, the government covers 80% of insured losses due to terrorism

This got me 😂

Canadians should install a new door on their side 😂

Sure, and let me know how it goes for you. I'm on a dell r720xd, about to upgrade my ram from 128 to 296 gb... don't want to spend the money for a new gpu right now.

I'll report back after I try again.

Okay. I finally understand what you mean 🥲

Authenticate a self hosted software stack in someone else's cloud 😂

That is a wild design choice. Glad it works for some...

Anyway... apologies for being ignorant

My interpretation of your linked instruction (granted, I haven't tried plex) is that it's the same two scenarios.

Your plex client app login talks directly to your server login. The client app meeting the server is arranged by the plex relay server and nothing more. There is no 'logging in' to the plex relay server; it's function is to arrange a meeting of two tunnels and that's it, much like a tailscale derp server.

The relay server is serving the same function as caddy on a VPS, hell, they could even be using tailscale under the hood and it'd look exactly the same to a user.

Anyway, attack vectors even with a public facing jellyfin are mitigated because

a) jellyfin is running in a docker container = a successful attacker would only be able to trash my jellyfin container, which ultimately is not that big of a deal (unless there is a different docker exploit that enables access to the server itself, which is an entirely different issue and larger than a jellyfin/plex discussion)

b) fail2ban in conjunction with a reverse proxy bans malicious ip addresses that come back with too many errors too many times (errors that you, the admin, specify) So, for example, brute force login attacks are mitigated.

c) the reverse proxy itself allows access to only one specified internal ip address/port combination. Pending a caddy exploit (again, a different discussion) it is not possible to fish for acrive ip addresses or port scan my internal network.

I see. So if you read that instruction you'll see it's the exact same setup that I outlined. They use a vpn to connect your client to your server and just negotiate the meeting in the middle. It's the exact same risk scenario as running a reverse proxy on your own vps. Unless I'm missing something else?

I don't see anything in the linked article about a relay server

Yes exactly. What do you think plex is doing?

My home connection is behind cgnat so I got a free VPS from oracle (provides a public ip address), install caddy on VPS, install tailscale on VPS and router, expose routes from LAN to tailscale network.

Now you can use caddy to expose, for example, a docker container (jellyfin) at 192.168.1.100 to subdomain.exampledomain.com with ssl cert provided by caddy.

VPS also requires some other stuff like ddclient and fail2ban.

I pieced this all together myself... it's doable if you spend some time reading.

It doesn't require Plex servers, though. I do this on jellyfin for free.