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Hi guys, I've been working on a self-hostable web analytics platform since the start of this year after being frustrated with Google Analytics and Plausible.
I've packed a bunch of cool web analytics features into Rybbit, but I've tried very hard to keep the interface simple to use,
https://github.com/rybbit-io/rybbit
Check it out!
What are you talking about, “yeah that’s the insecurity I’m talking about.”
I didn’t mention an insecurity and neither have you. Would you mind being a little more clear than “Docker pull is insecure?”
Frankly, I was expressing confidence in dockers security. It goes without saying though, any user can do insecure things like download from untrusted sources. That’s not dockers problem though, it’s the users.
Edit: I see now that you added “it’s the download that’s not verified.” Integrity is verified, so I assume you mean authorship (via signing)? I guess you’re saying that, if admin credentials are stolen from a container publisher and the thief force pushes malicious code into the registry under a pre-existing tag—then you would be exposed to that?
Even in that case, though, a digest cannot be overwritten. Tags can. So you’d just pin the digest to avoid this one attack vector?
Checksums are not for security. You need signatures. I'm not making claims that aren't clearly documented.
You’re talking about authorship. Sure. But if you verify the container yourself as secure and pin the digest, what’s the issue?
What you just described cannot be done. You can't verify it, because its not signed.
You’re making big claims on security here, like “cannot be done,” and each time you do I feel like we’re talking past each other a bit. I never claimed you can verify that the person who pushed the container had access to a private key file. I claimed you can verify the security of a container, specifically by auditing it and reviewing the publisher’s online presence. Best practices. Don’t upgrade right away, and pin digests to those which can be trusted.
When you pin a digest, you’re not going to get a container some malicious agent force pushed after the fact. You pinned the download to an immutable digest, so hot-swapping the container is out the window. What, as I understand, you’re concerned with is the scenario that a malicious actor (1) compromised the registry login beforehand, (2) you pinned the digest after hand, and (3) the attack is unnoticed by you and everyone else.
I’m trying to figure out under what conditions this would actually occur, and thus justifies the claim that
docker pullis insecure. In a work setting, I only see this being an issue if the process to test/upgrade existing ones is already an insecure process. Can you help me understand why I should believe that, even with best practices in place, Dockers own insecurities are unacceptable? Docker is used everywhere and I’m reluctant to believe everyone just doesn’t care about an unmanageable attack vector.