this post was submitted on 13 Nov 2025
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You are just moving things. When you change your EFI partition from being unencrypted and asking for your password to the BIOS asking for your password (or other credentials) you just shift the attack surface.
Somewhere there has to be an unencrypted part to start with.
Lock your unencrypted ESP down with secure boot and your own keys (shitty as it is that is in fact the one conceptional usecase of secure boot, not that stupid marketing bullshit MS is doing with getting vendors to pre-install Microsoft keys) to prevent tampering and you are good to go.
If you do this, be sure to make an image of your EFI partition and/or keys and keep it somewhere safe along with whatever is needed to restore the partition. Because if something tempers with it, your computer will stop booting because sighed hashes no longer match the ones calculated and you'll be locked out of your own system without some sort of way to restore the partition to a safe state.
@onlinepersona@programming.dev
Yes, preventing the boot process when something tempers with the files is the whole point of secure boot.
And beside the backups you should always have (remember: no backup, no pity for you...) the keys to sign your EFI files with are on the encrypted disk so the running system can get updated. So deactivating secure boot again, unlocking your encrypted disk from some live boot stick and fixing it is always an option (as is having a live system at hand signed by the same keys if you want to...).